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1. Introduction
It is commonly accepted in the psychological literature1 that people represent the
world around them with the aid of categories. In particular, information about other
people is often being processed with the aid of social categories. As Macrae and
Bodenhausen (2000) write
“ Given basic cognitive limitations and a challenging stimulus world,
perceivers need some way to simplify and structure the person percep-
tion process. This they achieve through the activation and implemen-
tation of categorical thinking. Rather than considering individuals in
terms of their unique constellations and proclivities, perceivers prefer
instead to construe them on the basis of the social categories (e.g.
race, gender, age) to which they belong. . .”
The purpose of the current paper is to study some issues related to categorical
thinking in the context of decision making. Specifically, our concern here is with
equilibrium behavior of agents in a non-cooperative normal form game. Equilibrium
is viewed here as a steady state of a recurring interaction between agents with no
strategic links among the repetitions. As such, it is highly sensitive to the information
(and the way its being processed) that every agent has about the actions of her
opponents. It is a key assumption of this paper that categorical thinking affects
exactly this information.
To study the implications of categorization in such scenarios we define a solution
concept called Conjectural Categorical Equilibrium (CCE). This is a special case of
Battigalli and Guaitoli’s (1988) conjectural equilibrium. Each player i is equipped
with an exogenously given partition of her opponents. This is the categorization
that i uses in order to facilitate the process of information about the behavior of
her opponents. As a consequence, i is unable to observe the actions taken by each
individual player. Instead, she can only tell what is the average behavior within
each category in her partition. Thus, when deciding what action to choose, player
i is facing uncertainty as to the actual choices of her opponents. In this case it is
natural to assume that i has some conjecture (which conforms with her information)
about the profile of actions that her opponents actually play, and that she plays a
best response to her conjecture. When all players behave in this way the resulting
strategy profile is a CCE.
When an agent is categorizing her opponents there is a risk that it will lead her to
make sub-optimal decisions and to lose utility. Therefore, in order for categorization
to be efficient it should have the property that the loss of information incurred by
the categorical representation of other agents will not result in choosing the wrong
action. In other words, each agent wants to choose the action that she would choose
1See Section 7 for references.
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had she known the entire strategy profile of her opponents. If the categorization of
every player has this property then every CCE is also a Nash equilibrium. We call
such a profile of categorizations sufficient. The main result of the paper concerns the
existence of non-trivial sufficient categorization profiles.
Our solution concept is plausible only if the number of participating players is
large. We therefore consider families of games with an increasing number of players.
The result we obtain is asymptotic. It is shown that, with appropriate anonymity
and continuity assumptions on the payoff functions, certain categorization profiles
become close to being sufficient as the number of players grows to infinity. These
categorization profiles are those in which each player lumps together players that
have symmetric influence on her payoffs.
The aforementioned result can be interpreted in several ways. First, it highlights
the advantage of categorization as a simplifying tool in complex environments. With
much less information in their hands agents behave as if they see the full picture. The
second interpretation is of normative nature. The result can be seen as a recommen-
dation of how one should categorize others when involved in a game-like situation.
Finally, the result also increases the plausibility of Nash equilibrium in large games
since it shows that an equilibrium must emerge even if players have limited informa-
tion about the strategies of their opponents.
The model we use in order to obtain the asymptotic result is adopted from Kalai
(2004). There is a finite universal set of actions S. Γ(S) is a family of normal form
games such that for every game G in Γ(S) and for every player i in G the set of
(pure) strategies available to i is some subset of S. With a fixed family Γ(S) in hand,
one can very naturally define notions of uniform continuity and anonymity in Γ(S).
These are the key assumptions needed in order to obtain the asymptotic existence of
a sufficient categorization profile. For a detailed discussion of the relation between
our assumptions and results and those of Kalai (2004, 2005) see Section 7.
As noted before, CCE is appealing when the number of players is large. It is
therefore natural to study it also in the setting of a game with a continuum of players.
Working in the model of Schmeidler (1973), we define CCE for a non-atomic game
similarly to its definition in the finite case. A simple sufficient condition for the
existence of sufficient categorization profile is provided. We then show that this
condition holds for a dense set of non-atomic games. Thus, every non-atomic game
can be approximated by a game in which a sufficient categorization profile exists.
The results described so far are of ‘positive’ nature. They emphasize the advan-
tages of categorization as an information processing mechanism. But these advan-
tages may cease to exist if an agent makes use of the ‘wrong’ categorization. To
illustrate this point we analyze two examples of non-atomic games in which agents
categorize their opponents not as one may think they should. In the first example it
is shown that this can lead to a CCE in which all the players get the worst possible
3
payoff. In the second example there is a CCE which yield a higher total payoff for the
society than the Nash equilibrium of the game (though the payoffs to some players
are lower than their equilibrium payoffs).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate our solution concept by
means of an example. CCE for both finite normal form games and non-atomic games
is formally defined in Section 3. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper
about sufficient categorization profiles. The influence that different categorizations
may have on social efficiency is exemplified in Section 5. Some remarks about the
model are in Section 6. These include a possible refinement of CCE and a result
regarding CCE as a purifying device. Related literature is discussed in Section 7.
All the proofs are in Section 8.
2. Choosing university: A motivating example
Every year, a large population of school graduates is required to make decisions
regarding higher education issues. For concreteness, let us focus on the set of all
graduates who have decided to apply to a medical school and are facing the problem
of which university to apply to.
There may be many factors influencing the preferences of a candidate. Some of
these factors, such as the university’s location and reputation, are independent of the
choices of other candidates. But other factors are directly affected by the decisions
made by other candidates. For instance, the probability of being accepted depends
on the profile of other candidates applying to the same university. Also, the financial
support that a university provides to a student may be relative to her socioeconomic
background in comparison to the socioeconomic background of other students. Every
candidate may also have preferences regarding the characteristics of her future fellow
students.
The situation can, therefore, be described as a game where candidates are the
players and universities are the (common) set of actions available to each player.
Notice that a similar game occurs every year but there are no strategic links among
the repetitions since every time the set of players is new.
An equilibrium of this recurring game is a list specifying the university that each
candidate applies to (or a probability distribution over the set of universities) such
that no candidate would like to revise her choice had she known the choices of all
other candidates. But the assumption that a candidate knows the decision of any
other candidate seems unreasonable in this case. A more realistic assumption is
that every candidate has only partial information about the choices of others2. This
2We emphasize that the cause for the lack of information is not necessarily that this information
is unavailable. It may well be that a candidate uses a simplified representation of the situation
due to its complexity. It is not important for our purposes whether the candidate doesn’t have the
information or chooses not to use it.
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information is based on the results of games from previous years. For instance, by
visiting a certain university a candidate can get an impression of some characteristics
of the students in this institute. And by looking on statistics of acceptance from
previous years a candidate can learn the universities to which candidates with high
school grades apply.
The CCE solution concept assumes that the information of every candidate about
the decisions of others has a particular structure. Namely, each candidate categorizes
the rest of the candidates according to some subjective criteria and can only tell the
proportion of candidates choosing each university in each category3. For example, if
the categorization of a certain candidate is based solely on sex (a category of males
and a category of females) then this candidate will only know the proportions of
the males and of the females which applied to each university. If another candidate
categorizes according to school grades (say ‘low’, ‘average’ and ‘high’ categories) then
her information will be the distribution of applications among the various universities
in each of these 3 sets of candidates. A third candidate may categorize according to
both criteria, thus having 6 different categories.
Since the information of a candidate is not complete she can only conjecture what
are the true choices of the others. Her conjecture, however, must be consistent with
the information she has. If every candidate plays a best response to some consistent
conjecture the resulting profile of strategies constitute a CCE. Notice that every
Nash equilibrium of the game is a CCE since the true profile of strategies is always
a consistent conjecture. But there may be many other CCE’s which are not Nash.
However, the main result of this paper shows that in many large games every CCE
is close to being Nash if the players are categorizing ‘correctly’.
3. Definition of CCE
3.1. Finite games. A gameG in normal form is defined by a tripletG = (N, {Si}i∈N ,
{ui}i∈N ). N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players. For each i ∈ N , Si is the finite set
of pure strategies (actions) of player i. Denote by S the product S = ×i∈NSi and
for every player i ∈ N let S−i = ×j 6=iSj . A typical element of S (Si, S−i) will be
denoted by s (si, s−i). ui : S → R is the utility function of player i ∈ N . Each
player i may use a mixed strategy which is a probability distribution over Si, usually
denoted by4 σi. If σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a profile of strategies then σ−i denotes the
strategies of players other than i. As usual, ui will also be used to denote expected
utility whenever players use mixed strategies.
3If some candidates play a mixed strategy then the information is only the expected proportion
of each university in each category.
4Thus, for every si ∈ Si, σi(si) is the probability of player i choosing the action si according to
the mixed strategy σi.
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Assume that every player i ∈ N categorizes the rest of the players according to
some criteria. Formally, for every i ∈ N let Ci be a partition of the set N \ {i}.
That is, Ci = {B1, . . . , Bm} where each Bj is a non-empty subset of N \ {i}, j 6= k
implies Bj ∩ Bk = ∅, and ∪mj=1Bj = N \ {i}. A categorization profile is a vector
C = (C1, . . . , Cn), where each Ci is a partition of N \ {i}. For two categorization
profiles C = (C1, . . . , Cn) and C ′ = (C ′1, . . . , C ′n), we say that C is finer than C ′ if
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Ci is finer than C ′i for every i ∈ N .
Assume that there is a finite universal set of actions S (not to be confused with
the product set S) such that Si ⊆ S for every i ∈ N . Every profile of (possibly
mixed) strategies6 σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ ×i∈N∆(Si) and a non-empty set of players
B ⊆ N induce a probability distribution over S, denoted σB, which is defined by7
σB(s) = 1|B|
∑
i∈B σi(s) for every s ∈ S. Thus, σB(s) is the expected proportion of
players choosing s in the set B according to the profile of strategies {σi}i∈B.
Given a player i ∈ N , a categorization Ci of N \ {i} and a profile of strategies
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), let FCi(σ−i) = {τ−i : τB−i = σB−i for every B ∈ Ci} be the set of
all strategy profiles of players other than i which induce the same distribution over
S like σ in every set B ∈ Ci. Elements of FCi(σ−i) are called consistent conjectures
of player i at σ−i.
Definition 1. σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Conjectural Categorical Equilibrium (CCE)
w.r.t. the categorization profile C = (C1, . . . , Cn) if, for every i ∈ N , there exists a
profile of strategies τ−i ∈ FCi(σ−i) such that σi is a best response to τ−i.
Assuming that a categorization profile is exogenously given, a profile of strate-
gies constitutes a CCE (w.r.t. the given categorization profile), if every player best
responds to some conjecture about the strategies of the others. However, the con-
jecture of every player must be consistent with what she knows about the strategies
of others, i.e., within the set FCi(σ−i).
The set of all CCE in a game G w.r.t. a given categorization profile C is denoted
by CCEG(C). NEG is the set of Nash equilibria of the game G. The following
observation is simple but important (the proof is omitted).
Lemma 1. For every game G,
(i) If C refines C ′ then CCEG(C) ⊆ CCEG(C ′).
(ii) If C is the finest categorization profile in G (every cell of every categorization
contains only one player) then CCEG(C) = NEG.
Corollary 1. Every Nash equilibrium is a CCE w.r.t. any categorization profile.
5For two partitions P and P ′ of the same set, P is finer than P ′ (or equivalently, P ′ is coarser
than P ) if every cell of P ′ is a union of cells of P .
6If X is a finite set then ∆(X) denotes the family of all probability measures over X.
7σi(s) = 0 whenever s ∈ S \ Si.
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3.2. A continuum of players. By its nature, the concept of CCE is more plausible
when the number of players is large. It is therefore natural to study this concept
in the environment of a non-atomic game. As we shall see below, working in the
limit with a continuum of players removes the need for many of the technical details
involved in the finite model. As a consequence the results become sharper and clearer.
We follow the model and notation of Schmeidler (1973)8. The set of players is
identified with the T = [0, 1] interval equipped with the Lebesgue measure λ. There
are n pure strategies, each of them represented by a vector ei from the standard basis
of Rn. The set of possible mixed strategies of every player is9 P = conv({e1, . . . , en}).
A T -strategy is (the equivalence class of) a measurable function xˆ from T to P ,
specifying the strategy chosen by each of the players. Pˆ is the set of all T -strategies
endowed with the L1 weak topology.
The utility of player t0 ∈ T when she chooses ei and almost every player in T plays
according to the T -strategy xˆ is ui(t0, xˆ). Denote u(t0, xˆ) = (u1(t0, xˆ), . . . , un(t0, xˆ)).
The payoff to player t0 when almost every player in T plays according to xˆ (and, of
course, t0 is playing xˆ(t0)) is the scalar product xˆ(t0) · u(t0, xˆ). Thus, a game with a
continuum of players can be identified with the function u : T × Pˆ → Rn.
We will only consider games u with the following two properties:
(1) u is continuous on Pˆ for every t ∈ T ; and
(2) u is measurable on T for every xˆ ∈ Pˆ .
As in the finite case, assume that every player t ∈ T has a finite and measurable
partition Ct of the set T of players10. Define FCt(xˆ) = {yˆ ∈ Pˆ :
∫
B xˆdλ =
∫
B yˆdλ
for every B ∈ Ct}. Again, if yˆ ∈ FCt(xˆ) we say that yˆ is a consistent conjecture of
player t at xˆ.
Definition 2. A T -strategy xˆ ∈ Pˆ is a Conjectural Categorical Equilibrium (CCE)
w.r.t. the categorization profile C = {Ct}t∈T if, for λ-almost every t ∈ T , there is a
T -strategy yˆt ∈ FCt(xˆ) such that xˆ(t) · u(t, yˆt) ≥ p · u(t, yˆt) for every p ∈ P .
Similarly to the finite case, we denote by CCEu(C) the set of all CCE in the game
with a continuum of players u w.r.t. the categorization profile C. NEu is the set
of Nash equilibria of u. The following is the analogue of Lemma 1 for the case of a
continuum of players.
Lemma 2. For every game with a continuum of players u,
(i) If C refines C ′ then CCEu(C) ⊆ CCEu(C ′).
(ii) NEu ⊆ CCEu(C) for every categorization profile C in u.
8Since we are interested in games which are not necessarily anonymous, the models of Mas-Colell
(1984) and of Rath (1992) are not suitable here.
9conv(A) denotes the convex hull of the set A.
10In this non-atomic setting it is not important for our purposes whether the partition is of T or
of T \ {t}. We also assume that the measure of each set in the partition is strictly positive.
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4. Sufficient categorization profiles
The current section contains the main results of the paper. It deals with a prop-
erty of categorization profiles which we call sufficiency. A categorization profile is
sufficient if a best response to every consistent conjecture of every player is also a best
response to the actual profile of actions. When an agent categorizes her opponents
according to a sufficient categorization she maintains her utility level with signifi-
cantly less mental effort. Exact and approximated sufficiency are formally defined
as follows.
Definition 3. Fix a game (either finite or non-atomic) and let ε ≥ 0. A categoriza-
tion profile C is ε-sufficient if every CCE w.r.t. C is an ε-Nash equilibrium11 of the
game. A categorization profile is sufficient if it is 0-sufficient.
The rest of this section discusses sufficient conditions for the existence of sufficient
categorization profiles. Of course, the finest categorization (in the finite case) in
which every category consists of only one agent is always sufficient. What we show,
however, is that for a wide family of games there are also non-trivial sufficient cate-
gorization profiles. We start with finite games and then move on to the non-atomic
case.
4.1. Sufficiency in finite games. We start with some notation. Fix a game G.
For a profile of actions s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S and two players j, k ∈ N with Sj = Sk,
let sjk be the profile of actions in which every player other than j and k plays the
same as in s and players j and k exchange their choices. That is, player j plays sk,
player k plays sj and every player l ∈ N \ {j, k} plays sl. For a player i ∈ N , we say
that the players j, k ∈ N \ {i} are exchangeable for i (denoted j ∼i k) if Sj = Sk and
ui(s) = ui(sjk) for every s ∈ S.
If j ∼i k then player i only cares about the pair of actions taken by players j and
k. She is not concerned with who plays what. Thus, assuming that i observes the
distribution of actions in each cell of her categorization, it is natural for her to put
j and k in the same cell.
It is easy to verify that ∼i is transitive and symmetric over N \ {i}. Let Cˆi be
the partition of N \ {i} to the equivalence classes of ∼i and let Cˆ = (Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn).
The element of Cˆi which contains player j will be denoted by Cˆi(j). Notice that
our notation neglects the dependence of the categorization profile Cˆ on the game G.
This is so since it will always be clear what is the relevant game. Notice also that Cˆ
is endogenous: Nothing besides the description of the game is required in order to
determine it.
If players were only allowed to play pure strategies and, in addition, players would
always conjecture that their opponents play pure strategies then Cˆ would have been
11A strategy profile constitute an ε-Nash equilibrium in a finite game if no player can gain more
than ε by deviating. In the non-atomic case the same should hold almost everywhere.
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sufficient (see Lemma 6 in subsection 8.1). However, since players may randomize
some conditions on the game must be added in order to maintain the sufficiency of
Cˆ. Although restricting the generality of our discussion, these conditions are valid
for a wide family of games.
Definition 4. Fix a finite set of actions S. Let Γ(S) denote a family of normal form
games such that for every game G ∈ Γ(S) and for every i ∈ N , Si ⊆ S.
(i) Γ(S) is uniformly bounded if there is M > 0 such that |ui| ≤ M for every
G ∈ Γ(S) and for every utility function ui ∈ G.
(ii) Γ(S) exhibits a diminishing effect of a single player if there is M > 0 such that
|ui(s) − ui(s′j ; s−j)| ≤ M|N | for every G ∈ Γ(S), every two players i, j ∈ N , every
s ∈ S and every s′j ∈ Sj.
The uniform boundness condition is standard. Diminishing effect of a single player
is a continuity condition. It states that the effect of some player j changing his action
on the payoff of another player i should be inversely proportional to the number of
players in the game. Finally, we will also need to impose a restriction about the
categorizations Cˆi in the family Γ(S). Namely, the games in Γ(S) should have a
sufficient degree of anonymity. This intuition is captured by the following conditions.
Definition 5. Let Γ(S) be as in Definition 4. Say that Γ(S) satisfies condition
(A1) if for every ε > 0 there is ρ > 0 such that #{j ∈ N \ {i} : |Cˆi(j)| < ρ|N |} <
ε|N | for every game G ∈ Γ(S) and for every i ∈ N .
(A2) if for every r, ε > 0 there is n0 such that |Cˆi|e−rd(G)i < ε for every game
G ∈ Γ(S) with |N | > n0 and for every i ∈ N , where d(G)i = minB∈Cˆi |B|.
Theorem 1. Consider a family Γ(S) of normal form games which is uniformly
bounded, exhibits a diminishing effect of a single player and satisfies at least one of the
conditions (A1) or (A2) of Definition 5. For every ε > 0 there exists n0 = n0(Γ(S), ε)
such that if G ∈ Γ(S) satisfies |N | > n0 then the categorization profile Cˆ in G is ε-
sufficient.
Remark 1. If Γ(S) satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 then, by Lemma 1, every
categorization profile which is finer than Cˆ is also ε-sufficient.
Remark 2. None of the conditions (A1) and (A2) implies the other. It is clear that
(A1) doesn’t imply (A2) since (A1) puts no restrictions on the size of the smallest
set in Cˆi. On the other hand, if the categorizations Cˆi contain
√|N | elements of size√|N | each then (A2) will be satisfied while (A1) will not.
Remark 3. If the number of categories in each of the categorizations Cˆi in the family
Γ(S) is uniformly bounded12, then condition (A1) of Definition 5 is satisfied. Indeed,
#{j ∈ N \ {i} : |Cˆi(j)| < ρ|N |} ≤ ρ|N ||Cˆi| ≤ ρ|N |M , so for a given ε > 0 one can
take ρ = εM .
12Formally, there is M > 0 such that |Cˆi| < M for every G ∈ Γ(S) and for every i ∈ N .
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We illustrate the result of Theorem 1 and the importance of the various conditions
with the following examples.
Example 1. (village versus beach) This example is taken from Kalai (2004,
Example 1). The universal set of actions is S = {v (village), b (beach)}. The family
Γ(S) contains games with |N | = 2n (n ∈ N) players of which n are ‘males’ and n
are ‘females’. The payoff of a male is equal to the proportion of females his choice
matches and the payoff of a female is equal to the proportion of males her choice
mismatches.
The categorization Cˆi of every player lumps together players of the same gender.
Indeed, the payoff of every player is not changed if two males (or females) exchange
their choices. Notice that the family Γ(S) is uniformly bounded (by M = 1) and
exhibits a diminishing effect of a single player (again, with M = 1). Moreover, Γ(S)
satisfies conditions (A1) and (A2) of Definition 5 (In fact, the condition in Remark
3 is also satisfied since always |Cˆi| = 2). Thus, by Theorem 1, when the number of
players becomes large every CCE w.r.t. the profile Cˆ is almost Nash.
As a matter of fact, in this particular example Theorem 1 is redundant and a
stronger result can be achieved by a much simpler argument. The reason is that the
signal that every player observes is the expected proportions of males and females in
each of the locations v and b. But from this signal a player can deduce his/her payoff
for every possible choice. Thus, if a player’s choice is optimal w.r.t. some consistent
conjecture then it is also optimal w.r.t. the true strategy profile of his/her opponents.
It follows that in the village versus beach game, no matter what is the number of
players, Cˆ is sufficient (and not just ε-sufficient).
Example 2. (A generalized village versus beach) Let S be as in the previous
example and fix two Lipschitz and non-decreasing functions f, g : [0, 1] → R. We
consider games of the following form. For each player i ∈ N there is a set F i ⊆
N \ {i} of i’s friends and a set Ei ⊆ N \ {i} of i’s enemies (F i ∩ Ei = ∅)13. The
payoff to player i is f(p)+g(q) where p is the proportion of i’s friends that her choice
matches and q is the proportion of i’s enemies that her choice mismatches.
It is clear that, without any further restrictions on the sets of friends and enemies,
a family Γ(S) of games in the above form will be uniformly bounded and will satisfy
condition (A1) (since always |Cˆi| ≤ 3. See Remark 3). In order to make sure that
the family of games exhibits a diminishing effect of a single player we need that, for
every i ∈ N , the sets F i and Ei are not too small in comparison to N . Specifically,
F i and Ei should contain a non-vanishing fraction of players.
We emphasize that the simple argument of the previous example is not valid in
this new scenario since consistent conjectures may lead to wrong actions. Indeed,
13We do not assume that the relations ‘to be a friend of’ and ‘to be an enemy of’ are symmetric
nor transitive.
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assume that F 1 = {2, 3, 4}, E1 = ∅, and F i = Ei = ∅ for every player i > 1.
Moreover, assume that f(p) = p3. The following strategy profile is a CCE (w.r.t.
Cˆ) which is not a Nash equilibrium. Player 1 plays v, players 2 and 3 play v with
probability 3/4 and b with probability 1/4, and player 4 plays b (the strategies of the
other players, if there are any, are arbitrary). The true payoff to player 1 in this case
is 0 · f(1) + 9/16 · f(2/3) + 6/16 · f(1/3) + 1/16 · f(0) = 13/72, whereas if she would
switch to b she will get 0 · f(0) + 9/16 · f(1/3) + 6/16 · f(2/3) + 1/16 · f(1) = 14/72.
Thus, the action of player 1 is suboptimal.
To see that the above profile is a CCE notice that one of the consistent conjectures
of player 1 is that players 2,3 play v with probability 1/4 and b with probability 3/4,
and player 4 plays v. If this is the belief that player 1 has then it is optimal for her
to play v since, by symmetry, this would give her a payoff of 14/72. Switching to b,
however, would reduce the payoff to 13/72.
Example 3. Let S = {v, b} as in the previous examples and consider a family Γ(S)
such that, for every positive integer n, Γ(S) contains a game with 3n + 1 players
defined as follows. For every k = 1, 2, . . . , n denote Ak = {3k − 1, 3k, 3k + 1}. The
payoff to player 1 is 1n
∑n
k=1
(
ak
3
)3 where ak is the number of players from the set Ak
which player’s 1 choice matches (k = 1, 2, . . . , n). The payoff functions of all other
players are constant.
The purpose of the this last example is to show that the uniform boundbess and di-
minishing effect conditions alone are not sufficient for Theorem 1 to hold. Notice first
that the payoffs in Γ(S) are uniformly bounded by 1. Also, the maximal difference
in player’s 1 payoff when some player j 6= 1 change his action is 1− 827n = 1927n < 10|N |
which means that the diminishing effect condition is satisfied. However, none of the
conditions (A1) or (A2) is satisfied since, for every n, Cˆ1 = {A1, A2, . . . , An} and
|Ak| = 3 for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Now, consider the following strategy profile. For every k = 1, 2, . . . , n, players
number 3k− 1 and 3k play v with probability 34 and b with probability 14 and player
number 3k+1 plays b with probability 1. The expected payoff to player 1 if he chooses
v is 1n · n ·
[
0 · 13 + 916 ·
(
2
3
)3 + 616 · (13)3 + 116 · 03] = 1372 , while choosing b yields an
expected payoff of 1n · n ·
[
0 · 03 + 916 ·
(
1
3
)3 + 616 · (23)3 + 116 · 13] = 1472 . However, a
consistent conjecture for player 1 is that, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n, players 3k− 1 and 3k
play v with probability 1/4 and b with probability 3/4, and player 3k + 1 plays v.
By symmetry, the expected payoff to 1 according to this conjecture is 1472 for playing
v and 1372 for playing b. Thus, the lose of utility for player 1 doesn’t vanish as the
number of players in the game grows.
4.2. Sufficiency in non-atomic games. When there is a continuum of players it
will be meaningless to define a relation ∼t analogous to the relation ∼i in the finite
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case. What we need in order to insure that a categorization profile will be sufficient is
that the utility of every player only depends on the distribution of actions in each set
of her partition. No other assumptions should be made and the sufficiency obtained
is not approximated as in the finite case. Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 2. Let u be a game with a continuum of players. If C = {Ct}t∈T is a
categorization profile such that, for every t ∈ T , u(t, xˆ) depends only on {∫B xˆdλ}B∈Ct
then C is sufficient.
Example 4. (A non-atomic generalized village versus beach) The following
example is taken (with cosmetic changes) from Schmeidler (1973)14. The number of
possible actions for every player is n = 2. For i = 1, 2 the utility of player t ∈ T
when she chooses ei and when the T -strategy is xˆ is ui(t, xˆ) = −
∫ t
0 xˆidλ, where xˆi is
the i’th component of the vector function xˆ. Thus, every player t prefers the action
which was less frequently used by her predecessors - the players [0, t). This situation
can be seen as a continuous analogue of the generalized village versus beach game,
where for every player t ∈ T the set of enemies is [0, t) and the set of friends is
empty.
Notice that the utility of every player t depends only on the integral
∫ t
0 xˆdλ. Thus,
by Theorem 2 the profile of categorizations C = {Ct}t∈T defined by Ct = {[0, t], (t, 1]}
is sufficient.
The question naturally arises is how ‘common’ are games with the property that
the utility of every player depends only on the average behavior of a finite number
of groups of the participating players. Our next aim is to show that the set of games
with this property is dense within the set of all non-atomic games. This implies
that every non-atomic game can be approximated by a game in which a sufficient
categorization profile exists.
We denote by Y the set of all possible (continuous) utility functions of a player.
That is Y = {v : Pˆ → IRn | v is continuous}. Since Pˆ is a compact we can define
a norm in Y by ‖v‖ = supxˆ∈Pˆ ‖v(xˆ)‖, where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm of IRn. A
non-atomic game u specifies the utility function of every player and is therefore an
element of the product space Y T . The set of all non-atomic games is denoted by
U ⊆ Y T (since u should be a measurable function of t not every element of Y T is a
game). Let U˜ ⊆ U be the set of all games u with the property that, for each player t,
there is a finite and measurable partition Ct of T such that u(t, xˆ) = u(t, yˆ) whenever∫
B xˆdλ =
∫
B yˆdλ for every B ∈ Ct.
Theorem 3. U˜ is dense in U .
14The original purpose of this example was to show that not every non-atomic game has a pure
strategy equilibrium.
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5. CCE and social efficiency
The previous section considered the case in which every player categorizes her
opponents “correctly” in the sense that players within each category are anonymous
in the eyes of the categorizer. The aim of the current section is to study some of
the effects that “wrong” categorizations may have. In particular, we are interested
in the social efficiency of profiles of strategies which constitute a CCE in comparison
to the efficiency of profiles which are Nash equilibria.
There may be various reasons why agents categorize others according to payoff
irrelevant criteria (that is, not according to the partitions Cˆ). First, it may be that
the partition Cˆi contains too many elements for player i to handle. If player i has
a limited computational ability then the number of different categories that she can
create in her mind is bounded. Thus, she cannot sort her opponents optimally if the
number of categories she needs to do so is greater than her ability15.
Another reason for sub-optimal categorization may be lack of information. Namely,
player i may not know the effect that the actions taken by player j have on her pay-
off. This naturally brings up the question of how players should categorize in a game
with incomplete information, which we will not discuss here.
As opposed to the previous section we do not pursue here general results. Rather,
we restrict attention to two examples which reflect the implications that categoriza-
tion can have on social efficiency. The first example shows how CCE may cause
all players to lose utility in comparison to their equilibrium payoffs (thus decreasing
the social efficiency of the strategy profile). In the second example it is shown that
a CCE may be more socially efficient than any Nash equilibrium. Both examples
are of non-atomic congestion games16 and can also be seen as special cases of the
(generalized non-atomic) village versus beach game.
Definition 6. Let u be a non-atomic game. The social efficiency of a strategy profile
xˆ ∈ Pˆ is eff(xˆ) = ∫T xˆ(t)u(t, xˆ)dλ(t).
Example 5. Consider the following non-atomic game with 2 possible actions (n =
2). If t ∈ [0, 12) then u1(t, xˆ) =
∫ 1
2
0 xˆ2dλ and u
2(t, xˆ) = 12 −u1(t, xˆ). For t ∈ [12 , 1] the
utility function is u1(t, xˆ) =
∫ 1
1
2
xˆ2dλ and u2(t, xˆ) = 12 − u1(t, xˆ). We call the players
in the interval [0, 12) type 1 players and those in [
1
2 , 1] are called type 2 players.
Thus, each player is trying to avoid players with his own type and is careless about
the choices of players from the other type.
Since payoffs depend only on the distribution of actions within each type of players
we may w.l.o.g. restrict attention to pure strategies. Denote by p1(xˆ) = λ({t ∈
15Recall that one of the reasons for the need to categorize in the first place is to save mental
resources. The issue of “optimal” categorization when there is a bound on the number of categories
seems to be of self interest.
16For a general study of social optimality in non-atomic congestion games see Milchtaich (2004).
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[0, 12) : xˆ(t) = e1}) and p2(xˆ) = λ({t ∈ [12 , 1] : xˆ(t) = e1}) the proportions
of players of types 1 and 2 respectively who choose the first action according to
xˆ. Then the social efficiency of a T -strategy xˆ is eff(xˆ) = 2p1(xˆ)(12 − p1(xˆ)) +
2p2(xˆ)(12 − p2(xˆ)). Notice that, in any equilibrium xˆ, it must be that p1(xˆ) = 14 and
p2(xˆ) = 14 . Therefore, the social efficiency in every equilibrium is
1
4 . Moreover, every
equilibrium is socially optimal in the sense that there is no profile of strategies xˆ
with eff(xˆ) > 14 .
By Theorem 2 the categorization profile defined by Ct = {[0, 12), [12 , 1]} for every
t ∈ T , as well as any finer categorization profile, is sufficient. However, assume
that players categorize their opponents differently and that the categorization of all
the players is the same. For instance, this corresponds to the case where players
are categorizing according to some publicly observed property (such as gender or
skin color). For simplicity we restrict attention to the case in which the (common)
categorization has only two elements (say, M=Males and F=Females) each of which
have a measure of 12 .
Let α = λ(M ∩ [0, 12)) be the measure of the set of type 1 males, and let g(α) =
min {eff(xˆ) ; xˆ ∈ CEu({M,F})} be the lowest social efficiency of a CCE17. We have
Proposition 1.
g(α) =

1
4 − 16α2 0 ≤ α ≤ 18
0 18 ≤ α ≤ 38
1
4 − 16(12 − α)2 38 ≤ α ≤ 12
Specifically, if the payoff relevant partition (type 1 versus type 2) and the actual
categorization (males versus females) are independent (α = 14) or not “too depen-
dent” (18 ≤ α ≤ 38) then there exists a CCE in which all the players get the worst
possible payoff. As α approaches 0 or 12 the social efficiency of any CCE increases to
the optimal level.
Example 6. Consider the following non-atomic game with 2 possible actions (n =
2). If t ∈ [0, 34) then u1(t, xˆ) = 14 +
∫ 3
4
0 xˆ2dλ + 2
∫ 1
3
4
xˆ2dλ and u2(t, xˆ) =
∫ 3
4
0 xˆ1dλ +
2
∫ 1
3
4
xˆ1dλ. For t ∈ [34 , 1] the utility function is u1(t, xˆ) = 2
∫ 3
4
0 xˆ2dλ +
∫ 1
3
4
xˆ2dλ and
u2(t, xˆ) = 1 + 2
∫ 3
4
0 xˆ1dλ +
∫ 1
3
4
xˆ1dλ. Players in the interval [0, 34) are called type 1
players and those in [34 , 1) type 2 players. The payoff to players of each type equals
the proportion of players of their own type that their choice mismatches plus twice
the proportion of players of the other type that their choice mismatches. In addition,
players of type 1 get 14 if they choose the first action and players of type 2 get 1 if
they choose the second action.
17One can convince herself that g indeed depends only on α and not on the choice of the sets M
and F .
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As in the previous example, we restrict attention to pure strategy profiles and
denote p1(xˆ) = λ({t ∈ [0, 34) : xˆ(t) = e1}) and p2(xˆ) = λ({t ∈ [34 , 1] : xˆ(t) = e1})
the proportions of players of types 1 and 2 respectively who choose the first action
according to xˆ. the efficiency of a T -strategy xˆ is then given by eff(xˆ) = −2p1(xˆ)2−
2p2(xˆ)2 − 8p1(xˆ)p2(xˆ) + 114 p1(xˆ) + 104 p2(xˆ) + 14 . It is not hard to verify that there is
a unique equilibrium in this game. Namely, all type 1 players choose the first action
(p1(xˆ) = 3/4) while all type 2 players choose the other option (p2(xˆ) = 0). The
social efficiency of the equilibrium strategy is equal to 1916 = 1.1875.
However, assume that the categorization of all the players is trivial. That is,
Ct = {T} for all t ∈ T . In this case there is a CCE which is more efficient than the
Nash equilibrium. Indeed, it is a simple exercise to check that the set of CCE in this
case is {xˆ : 12 ≤ p1(xˆ) ≤ 34 , p2(xˆ) = 0}. Taking xˆ to be a profile with p1(xˆ) = 1116
and p2(xˆ) = 0 gives a CCE with social efficiency of 153128
∼= 1.1953. Moreover, such a
profile is socially optimal.
6. Discussion
6.1. Simple conjectures: A refinement. In a CCE the conjecture of an agent
is limited only by the signal she observed (and by the restriction that agents play
independently of each other). One may want to restrict the belief that an agent can
have even more by requiring that it will be simple in some sense18. By so doing, a
refinement of CCE can be obtained.
Among all the possible conjectures of a player there is one which can quite naturally
be considered as the simplest. Namely, the conjecture in which all players in each
cell of her partition are playing the same strategy. A player holding this belief can
be seen as having a prototypical agent for each set in her partition. All the players in
each set are playing the same as their representing prototype. The common strategy
in each cell is then uniquely determined by the signal the player observed.
We would like to make this last idea formal both in finite games and in games
with a continuum of players. First, in the finite model, let fCi(σ−i) ∈ FCi(σ−i) be
the (unique) strategies vector of players other than i in which σj = σk whenever j
and k are in the same cell of the partition Ci. The refinement of CCE, which we
call prototypical equilibrium requires that every player i plays optimally against the
strategy profile fCi(σ−i). Formally,
Definition 7. σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a prototypical equilibrium w.r.t. the categorization
profile C = (C1, . . . , Cn) if, for every i ∈ N , σi is a best response to fCi(σ−i).
The definition in the non-atomic setting is similar. First, for a partition R of
T and a player t ∈ T , R(t) denotes the cell of R which contains t. If xˆ ∈ Pˆ is a
18This idea is certainly not new. Eliaz (2003) and Spiegler (2002 and 2004) are examples of
papers in which the solution concept takes into account the complexity of the belief of an agent
about what others will do.
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T -strategy, let fR(xˆ) denote the T -strategy defined by fR(xˆ)(t) = 1λ(R(t))
∫
R(t) xˆdλ.
Notice that always fR(xˆ) ∈ FR(xˆ).
Definition 8. xˆ ∈ Pˆ is a prototypical equilibrium w.r.t. the categorization profile
C = {Ct}t∈T if xˆ(t) is a best response to fCt(xˆ) for almost every t ∈ T .
We emphasize that a prototypical equilibrium is always a CCE (w.r.t. the same
categorization profile). However, unlike CCE, it may well be that a Nash equilibrium
is not a prototypical equilibrium. Existence of a prototypical equilibrium in every
game (finite or infinite) is guaranteed by a standard fixed point argument.
6.2. Correlated conjectures. The sufficiency result of subsection 4.1 relies heav-
ily on the assumption that a player takes into account only independent profiles of
strategies of her opponents. That is, we rule out the possibility that some player
thinks that other players correlate their strategies, even though this correlated strat-
egy might be consistent with the signal that this player observes. The fact that
correlated conjectures are not allowed enables us to use the power of the laws of
large numbers, which otherwise fail.
To emphasize this point we return to the generalized village versus beach game
(Example 2). Assume that, for some player i ∈ N , F i = N \{i} and Ei = ∅, and that
F j = Ej = ∅ for all other players j. As opposed to Example 2, we do not assume
that the function f is non-decreasing19. Specifically, consider the function f defined
by f(x) = 3x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 13 and f(x) = 43 − x for 13 ≤ x ≤ 1.
If correlated conjectures were allowed then the following profile of strategies would
constitute a CCE w.r.t. the categorization profile Cˆ. Player i plays v with probability
1 and every other player plays v with probability 23 and b with probability
1
3 . Indeed,
a consistent (correlated) conjecture of player i is that either all the players play v
(with probability 23) or all the players play b (with probability
1
3). For this conjecture
the best response of i is v since 23f(1)+
1
3f(0) >
2
3f(0)+
1
3f(1). However, this profile
of strategies does not become approximately Nash as the number of players increases.
This is because the payoff to player i will be close to f(23) =
2
3 while deviating to b
would result in a payoff close to f(13) = 1.
6.3. Pure equilibrium. The fact that Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may fail
to exist is seen by many as a drawback of this solution concept. Even in games
with a continuum of players, a certain degree of anonymity is required in order
to insure the existence of a pure equilibrium (see Remarks 2 and 3 in Schmeidler,
1973). The reason that players need to randomize in equilibrium is to hide their
action from their opponents. The same goal can be achieved by using the CCE
solution concept. The fact that an agent cannot predict accurately her opponents
19A possible interpretation is that a player wants to be with her friends, but not with too many
of them.
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behavior eliminates in some cases the need for randomization in equilibrium. This
phenomenon is demonstrated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let u be a game with a continuum of players, and let C∗ be a partition
of T . Assume that C = {Ct}t∈T is a profile of categorizations such that C∗ is finer
than Ct for every t ∈ T . Then there is a pure CCE w.r.t. C20.
To illustrate the idea consider Example 4. Assume that Ct = {T} for every t ∈ T .
Thus, the signal to every player is just the average behavior of the entire set of
players. The pure T -strategy xˆ defined by xˆ(t) = e1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 12 and xˆ(t) = e2 for
1
2 < t ≤ 1 is a CCE w.r.t. C = {Ct}t∈T . Indeed, for every t ∈ T , FCt(xˆ) contains a
T -strategy for which xˆ(t) is a best response.
Finally, we note that the condition that Ct is coarser than some C∗ for all t ∈ T is
necessary for the theorem to hold. This can be seen by considering the categorization
profile Ct = {[0, t], (t, 1]}, t ∈ T in the above example.
6.4. Self categorization. Throughout the discussion of finite games the categoriza-
tion of player i is of the set N \ {i}. Thus, i doesn’t include herself in any of the
groups of her categorization. The reason for this modeling choice is the common
assumption that every agent knows the action he plays. Inserting i into one of the
cells of her partition Ci (say B) can create a situation in which i’s conjecture (about
what the players in B are playing) is consistent with her signal (the expected behav-
ior within B) but not with the action which she actually plays. Leaving i out of her
own partition prevents such an awkward situation.
It should be noted, however, that individuals do not exclude themselves from their
categorical perception of the society. In fact, self categorization and identity are
among the most studied subjects in social psychology (for references see Ellemers et
al., 2002). The social categories to which one belongs and the way these categories are
seen by the society can have significant implications on one’s choices. This important
issue is not addressed by the current paper.
7. Related literature
Our main result (Theorem 1) is inspired by the works of Kalai (2004, 2005) on
the robustness of equilibria in large games. There, it is shown that when the number
of players is large Nash equilibria of a wide family of games are immune to many
modifications of the game. These modifications include various extensive form ver-
sions of the game such as sequential play (instead of simultaneous play) and versions
in which players can revise their initial choices. The main difference between the
current paper and Kalai’s is that here we keep the game unchanged while allowing
players’ believes about their opponents strategies to be incorrect. Since in general
20Reading the proof, one can see that existence of a pure prototypical equilibrium w.r.t. C is also
guaranteed under the conditions of the theorem.
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it is impossible to construct an extensive version of a game in which Nash equilibria
corresponds to CCE of the original game, the results of Kalai do not imply ours.
It is interesting to compare our model and assumptions to those of Kalai. A
first difference is that we study only complete information games while Kalai allows
players to be of several types (though a key assumption in his paper is that types
are drawn independently from some universal finite set). Another difference is in
the anonymity and continuity assumptions used. In Kalai’s paper the payoff to a
player depends on his own type and action and on the empirical distribution of type-
action characters of the other players. This implies that, with probability 1, the
categorization Cˆi will be the same for all the players21. In the current paper ‘types’
of players are subjective in the sense that the categorization Cˆi is likely to depend
on i. Moreover, the number of different ‘types’ (elements of the categorization Cˆi) is
not bounded and can grow to infinity as |N | grows to infinity22.
The condition of diminishing effect of a single player (Definition 4 (ii)) is slightly
different than the uniform equicontinuity condition of Kalai (2004, Definition 3).
None of them implies the other. Uniform equicontinuity implies semi-anonymity in
the sense of Kalai (2004, Definition 2) which will make our analysis trivial. But
the diminishing effect condition requires that the change in payoff when one player
change his action will be inversely proportional to the number of players in the game.
This property is not implied by uniform equicontinuity.
The concept of Nash equilibrium in normal form games with a continuum of players
is originated in the work of Schmeidler (1973). The main result there is the existence
of a pure equilibrium when the game is anonymous. Similar results in different
models were obtained by Mas-Colell (1984) and by Rath (1992). Theorem 4 shows
that CCE can in some cases eliminate the need for randomization even if the game
is not anonymous. A comprehensive survey of the literature about games with a
continuum of players can be found in Ali Khan and Sun (2002).
CCE is a special case of Battigalli and Guaitoli’s (1988) Conjectural Equilibrium
(CE). Therefore, this paper can be seen as contributing to the literature originates
in the works of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)23, who defined the concept of
rationalizability. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) generalized rationalizability to the
case where each agent observes some exogenously defined signal, which is a function
of the actions taken by the agents. A profile of actions is a Rationalizable Conjectural
Equilibrium (RCE) if every player’s action is optimal w.r.t. some consistent conjec-
ture about the actions of her opponents. A consistent conjecture is one that can’t
21More accurately, for every two players i, j the partitions Cˆi excluding player j and Cˆj excluding
player i will be identical. Notice, however, that when different profiles of types are realized this
common categorization may very well change.
22If |Cˆi| is uniformly bounded in Γ(S) then, by Remark 3, Theorem 1 holds.
23Bernheim’s paper is more relevant to the current work since it highlights normal form games.
Pearce, on the other hand, emphasizes extensive form games.
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be contradicted by the realized signal that the agent observed when combined with
common knowledge of rationality. When the signal to every player contains only her
own action the RCE concept boils down to rationalizability, while when the signal to
every player is the entire profile of actions the RCE is the same as Nash equilibrium.
CE of Battigalli and Guaitoli (1988) is a weaker solution concept than RCE, since
the common knowledge of rationality assumption is removed. Thus, with the same
signal functions, a profile of strategies may be a CE but not an RCE.
One may ask why we use CE and not RCE as our solution concept. Two reasons
justify this choice. The first is that the games we analyze have many players. It
is natural to assume that in this case players do not “get into the head” of their
opponents and draw conclusions which change their beliefs, simply because it is too
complicated to do so. Second, every RCE is also a CE. Thus, our main results
wouldn’t change had we define CCE using RCE and not CE.
Each one of these solution concepts is weaker than Nash equilibrium. In the final
section of their paper Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) suggest that the plausibility
of Nash equilibrium increases when every RCE is also Nash. They write
“. . . In games with this property the Nash equilibrium concept is
more compelling, because in a sense the equilibrium requires less in-
formation on the part of the players. It may therefore be of interest
to identify conditions under which, for some natural signal function
such as one’s own payoff, RCE and Nash equilibria are equivalent.”
Theorems 1 and 2 provide precisely the kind of conditions that Rubinstein and
Wolinsky are talking about. The signal function of a player, however, is not her own
payoff but the expected behavior of groups of her opponents.
Attempts to weaken the assumption that agents predict accurately the actions
of their opponents have been made in settings other than normal form games. For
extensive form games Fudenberg and Levine’s (1993) self-confirming equilibrium is
based on the fact that agents’ beliefs are correct only along the equilibrium path of
play24. In Jehiel’s (2005) analogy-based expectation equilibrium agents bundle nodes
in which other players should move and can only tell what is the average behavior in
every class of nodes. In fact, our prototypical equilibrium is a special case of Jehiel’s
concept. For repeated games, Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b) introduced the notion
of subjective equilibrium where player’s beliefs are not contradicted by the observed
choices of their opponents.
Some recent papers discuss the implications of categorical thinking for decision
making. Fryer and Jackson (2004) develop a model of how past experiences are
sorted into categories and show that certain biases in decision making emerge from
this process. Pe¸ski (2006) shows that in symmetric environments categorization is
24See also Dekel et al. (1999).
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an optimal way for predicting properties of future instances based on past instances.
Finally, for surveys about categorization in social psychology see Fiske (1998) and
Macrae and Bodenhausen (2000).
8. Proofs
8.1. Proof of Theorem 1. We start with several lemmas. Fix a family of games
Γ(S) which is uniformly bounded (by a constant M > 0) and exhibits a diminishing
effect of a single player (w.l.o.g. with the same constant M).
For the following Lemmas 3-8 and 10-11 fix a game G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈
Γ(S), a player i ∈ N , a profile of strategies σ and two positive numbers δ, ρ > 0. A
typical element of the categorization Cˆi will be denoted by B. Let
Eρ =
{
B ∈ Cˆi : |B| ≥ ρ|N |
}
and Hρ = Cˆi \Eρ =
{
B ∈ Cˆi : |B| < ρ|N |
}
.
For every B ∈ Cˆi and for every s ∈ S let
Dδ(B, s) =
{
s−i ∈ S−i :
∣∣∣∣#{j ∈ B : sj = s}|B| − σB(s)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ} ,
and denote
Dδ,ρ =
⋃
B∈Eρ
⋃
s∈S
Dδ(B, s), Dδ =
⋃
B∈Cˆi
⋃
s∈S
Dδ(B, s).
Let Pσ−i denote the probability measure on S−i induced by the profile of strategies
σ−i.
Lemma 3. Pσ−i(Dδ(B, s)) ≤ 2e−2|B|δ
2
For every B ∈ Cˆi and for every s ∈ S.
Proof. For a given B ∈ Cˆi and s ∈ S consider the sequence of independent random
variables (Xj)j∈B defined by Xj = 1 if player j realized strategy is s and Xj = 0
otherwise. Let X =
∑
j∈BXj . We have Dδ(B, s) =
{∣∣∣ X|B| − σB(s)∣∣∣ ≥ δ} where
σB(s) is the expected value of the random variable X|B| . By a classical bound of
Hoeffding (see for instance Petrov, 1975 chapter III) the probability of this event is
not greater than 2e−2|B|δ2 .
Lemma 4. Pσ−i(Dδ,ρ) ≤ 2|S|e
−2|N|ρδ2
ρ and Pσ−i(Dδ) ≤ 2|S||Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ
2
.
Proof. Using the previous lemma, and by the definition of Eρ
Pσ−i(Dδ,ρ) ≤
∑
B∈Eρ
∑
s∈S
2e−2|B|δ
2
= 2|S|
∑
B∈Eρ
e−2|B|δ
2
≤ 2|S|
∑
B∈Eρ
e−2ρδ
2|N | ≤ 2|S|e
−2|N |ρδ2
ρ
.
Also,
Pσ−i(Dδ) ≤
∑
B∈Cˆi
∑
s∈S
2e−2|B|δ
2
= 2|S|
∑
B∈Cˆi
e−2|B|δ
2 ≤ 2|S||Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ2 .
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Lemma 5. If τ−i ∈ FCˆi(σ−i) then the bounds of Lemma 4 hold when Pσ−i is replaced
with Pτ−i. In particular, |Pσ−i(Dδ,ρ) − Pτ−i(Dδ,ρ)| ≤ 2|S|e
−2|N|ρδ2
ρ and |Pσ−i(Dδ) −
Pτ−i(Dδ)| ≤ 2|S||Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ
2
.
Proof. τ−i ∈ FCˆi(σ−i) means that σB(s) = τB(s) for every B ∈ Cˆi and for every
s ∈ S. Thus, Lemma 4 may be applied without any change to Pτ−i . It follows
that both Pτ−i(Dδ,ρ) and Pσ−i(Dδ,ρ) are in the interval
[
0, 2|S|e
−2|N|ρδ2
ρ
]
. Similarly,
Pτ−i(Dδ) and Pσ−i(Dδ) are both in the interval
[
0, 2|S||Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ2
]
.
Lemma 6. Fix two profiles of actions s, s′ ∈ S. If s−i ∈ FCˆi(s′−i) then ui(s) = ui(s′).
Proof. s−i ∈ FCˆi(s′−i) means that #{j ∈ B : sj = s} = #{j ∈ B : s′j = s} for
every s ∈ S and for every B ∈ Cˆi. Thus, for every B ∈ Cˆi, there is a permutation
of players’ names in the set B which transforms the restriction of s to B to the
restriction of s′ to B. However, every such permutation of players in the set B can
be achieved by a sequence of exchanges of pairs of players. By the definition of the
partition Cˆi, every such exchange doesn’t affect the payoff of player i. The assertion
follows.
Lemma 7. If s−i, s′−i ∈ S−i \Dδ then |ui(si ; s−i)−ui(si ; s′−i)| ≤ δ|S|M for every
si ∈ Si.
Proof. Since both s−i and s′−i are not in Dδ it follows that |#{j ∈ B : sj =
s} −#{j ∈ B : s′j = s}| ≤ 2δ|B| for every B ∈ Cˆi and for every s ∈ S. Thus, there
is a profile of actions s′′−i ∈ FCˆi(s′−i) such that s′′−i is obtained from s−i by no more
than
∑
B∈Cˆi
∑
s∈S δ|B| = δ|S|(|N | − 1) changes in players’ actions. By the previous
lemma, we have that |ui(si ; s−i) − ui(si ; s′−i)| = |ui(si ; s−i) − ui(si ; s′′−i)|. By
the diminishing effect assumption, the influence of some player j 6= i changing her
action on the utility function ui is not greater than M|N | . It follows that |ui(si ; s−i)−
ui(si ; s′′−i)| ≤ δ|S| (|N | − 1) M|N | ≤ δ|S|M .
Lemma 8. If s−i, s′−i ∈ S−i\Dδ,ρ then |ui(si ; s−i)−ui(si ; s′−i)| ≤M
(
δ|S|+
∑
B∈Hρ |B|
|N |
)
for every si ∈ Si.
Proof. Repeat the same argument as in the previous lemma for every set B ∈ Eρ.
The total number of players which belong to one of the sets in Hρ (the complement
of Eρ) is
∑
B∈Hρ |B|. By the diminishing effect assumption the total influence of
these players on the payoff of i is bounded by
M
∑
B∈Hρ |B|
|N | . The assertion follows.
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Lemma 9. Let Ω be a finite set, P,Q two probability measures on Ω, X : Ω→ R a
random variable and ε > 0. Let A ⊆ Ω be an event such that |P (A) − Q(A)| ≤ ε,
and assume that r ≤ X(ω) ≤ R for every ω ∈ A (r ≤ R are two constants). Then∣∣∑
ω∈AX(ω)(P (ω)−Q(ω))
∣∣ ≤ R− r + εmax(|r|, |R|).
Proof. Denoting EP (EQ) the expectation operator w.r.t. to the measure P (Q), one
has ∣∣∣∣∣∑
ω∈A
X(ω)(P (ω)−Q(ω))
∣∣∣∣∣ = |P (A)EP (X|A)−Q(A)EQ(X|A)|
≤ |P (A)EP (X|A)−Q(A)EP (X|A)|+ |Q(A)EP (X|A)−Q(A)EQ(X|A)|
= |P (A)−Q(A)||EP (X|A)|+Q(A)|EP (X|A)− EQ(X|A)|
≤ εmax(|R|, |r|) +R− r.
Lemma 10. If τ−i ∈ FCˆi(σ−i) then
|ui(si ; σ−i)− ui(si ; τ−i)| ≤M |S|
(
δ + 6|Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ2
)
for every si ∈ Si.
Proof.
|ui(si ; σ−i)− ui(si ; τ−i)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s−i∈Dδ
ui(si ; s−i)
(
Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s−i∈S−i\Dδ
ui(si ; s−i)
(
Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The first sum can be estimated by∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s−i∈Dδ
ui(si ; s−i)
(
Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤M ·
∑
s−i∈Dδ
|Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)| ≤ M ·
(
Pσ−i(Dδ) + Pτ−i(Dδ)
)
≤ M · 4|S||Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ2 ,
where the first inequality is due to the fact that Γ(S) is uniformly bounded byM , and
the third inequality is by Lemmas 4 and 5. In order to estimate the second sum we
use Lemma 9 with Ω = S−i, P = Pσ−i , Q = Pτ−i , X(ω) = ui(si ; ω), A = S−i \Dδ
and ε = 2|S||Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ2 . Notice that, by Lemma 7, the utility ui(si ; ·) is bounded
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in an interval of length not larger than δ|S|M . Thus,∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s−i∈S−i\Dδ
ui(si ; s−i)
(
Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ|S|M +M · 2|S||Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ2 .
Summing up the two inequalities gives the desired bound.
Lemma 11. If τ−i ∈ FCˆi(σ−i) then
|ui(si ; σ−i)− ui(si ; τ−i)| ≤M
(
δ|S|+
∑
B∈Hρ |B|
|N | +
6|S|e−2|N |ρδ2
ρ
)
for every si ∈ Si.
Proof. Similarly to the previous proof,
|ui(si ; σ−i)− ui(si ; τ−i)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s−i∈Dδ,ρ
ui(si ; s−i)
(
Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s−i∈S−i\Dδ,ρ
ui(si ; s−i)
(
Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
By Lemmas 4 and 5,∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s−i∈Dδ,ρ
ui(si ; s−i)
(
Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤M · 4|S|e
−2|N |ρδ2
ρ
.
The second sum is estimated by Lemma 9 with Ω = S−i, P = Pσ−i , Q =
Pτ−i , X(ω) = ui(si ; ω), A = S−i \ Dδ,ρ and ε = 2|S|e
−2|N|ρδ2
ρ . Notice that, by
Lemma 8, the utility ui(si ; ·) is bounded in an interval of length not larger than
M
(
δ|S|+
∑
B∈Hρ |B|
|N |
)
. Thus,∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s−i∈S−i\Dδ,ρ
ui(si ; s−i)
(
Pσ−i(s−i)− Pτ−i(s−i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤M
(
δ|S|+
∑
B∈Hρ |B|
|N | +
2|S|e−2|N |ρδ2
ρ
)
.
Summing up the two inequalities gives the desired bound.
The proof of Theorem 1 with condition (A1):
Assume that Γ(S) satisfies (A1) and fix ε > 0. Choose 0 < δ < ε6M |S| . By (A1), there
is ρ > 0 such that
∑
B∈Hρ |B|
|N | <
ε
6M for every G ∈ Γ(S) and for every i ∈ N . After
fixing such δ and ρ, let n0 be large enough so that
6|S|e−2n0ρδ2
ρ <
ε
6M . Fix G ∈ Γ(S)
with |N | > n0 and let σ be a CCE w.r.t. Cˆ in G.
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Then, for every i ∈ N , there is a strategy profile τ−i ∈ FCˆi(σ−i) such that σi is a
best response to τ−i. It follows from Lemma 11 that, for every i ∈ N and for every
si ∈ Si, |ui(si ; σ−i)− ui(si ; τ−i)| ≤ ε2 . Thus,
ui(si ; σ−i) ≤ ui(si ; τ−i) + ε2 ≤ ui(σi ; τ−i) +
ε
2
≤ ui(σi ; σ−i) + ε.
The proof of Theorem 1 with condition (A2):
Assume that Γ(S) satisfies (A2) and fix ε > 0. Fix 0 < δ < ε4M |S| . By (A2) there
is n0 large enough so that 6|Cˆi|e−2d(G)iδ2 < ε4M |S| for every G ∈ Γ(S) with |N | > n0
and for every i ∈ N . Fix G ∈ Γ(S) with |N | > n0 and let σ be a CCE w.r.t. Cˆ in G.
Then, for every i ∈ N , there is a strategy profile τ−i ∈ FCˆi(σ−i) such that σi is a
best response to τ−i. It follows from Lemma 10 that, for every i ∈ N and for every
si ∈ Si, |ui(si ; σ−i)− ui(si ; τ−i)| ≤ ε2 . Thus,
ui(si ; σ−i) ≤ ui(si ; τ−i) + ε2 ≤ ui(σi ; τ−i) +
ε
2
≤ ui(σi ; σ−i) + ε.
8.2. Proof of Theorem 2. Assume that xˆ ∈ Pˆ is a CCE w.r.t. a categorization
profile C = {Ct}t∈T which satisfy the conditions of the theorem. For every player
t ∈ T , the payoff function u(t, ·) is constant on the set FCt(xˆ). Also, it is clear that
xˆ ∈ FCt(xˆ). Thus, since for almost every t ∈ T xˆ(t) is a best response to some
yˆ ∈ FCt(xˆ), it follows that, for almost every t ∈ T , xˆ(t) is also a best response to xˆ.
This means that xˆ is also a Nash equilibrium.
8.3. Proof of Theorem 3. Let Πt : Y T → Y be the projection function on the
coordinate t. Since we work with the product topology in Y T it will be sufficient to
show that Πt(U˜) is dense in Y for every t ∈ T . Since Πt(U˜) is independent of t we
denote A = Πt(U˜).
Recall that A is the set of all continuous functions v : Pˆ → IRn with the property
that there exists a finite measurable partition R of T such that v(xˆ) = v(yˆ) whenever∫
B xˆdλ =
∫
B yˆdλ for every B ∈ R. In order to prove that A is dense in Y it is
sufficient to do so for each one of the n coordinates of v separately. Thus, with abuse
of notation, we let Y = {v : Pˆ → IR | v is continuous} and A ⊆ Y is the class of
(real valued) functions which depend only on the integral of the T -strategy over a
finite number of sets in T .
Claim 1. A is a vector subspace of Y .
Proof. Let v1, v2 ∈ A. Then there are finite partitions R1, R2 of T such that v1
depends only on
{∫
B xˆdλ
}
B∈R1 and v2 depends only on
{∫
B xˆdλ
}
B∈R2 . let R be a
finite partition which is finer than both R1 and R2. If
∫
B xˆdλ =
∫
B yˆdλ for every
B ∈ R then ∫B xˆdλ = ∫B yˆdλ for every B ∈ R1 ∪ R2. Thus, for such xˆ, yˆ ∈ Pˆ ,
v1(xˆ) + v2(xˆ) = v1(yˆ) + v2(yˆ). This implies that v1 + v2 ∈ A. Finally, if α ∈ IR then
obviously αv1 ∈ A
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Claim 2. A is a subalgebra of (the algebra) Y . Moreover, A contains the constant
functions.
Proof. To prove that if v1, v2 ∈ A then v1 · v2 ∈ A repeat the argument of Claim 1.
Also, it is clear that every constant function is in A.
Claim 3. A separates points of Pˆ . That is, for every xˆ 6= yˆ ∈ Pˆ there is v ∈ A such
that v(xˆ) 6= v(yˆ).
Proof. Fix xˆ 6= yˆ ∈ Pˆ . For i = 1, . . . , n define the sets B1i = {t ∈ T : xˆi(t) > yˆi(t)}
and B2i = {t ∈ T : xˆi(t) < yˆi(t)}. xˆ 6= yˆ implies that there is 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
λ(B1i ) > 0 or λ(B
2
i ) > 0. Assume w.l.o.g. that λ(B
1
1) > 0. Consider the function
v ∈ Y defined by v(zˆ) = ∫B11 zˆ1dλ for every zˆ ∈ Pˆ .
First, notice that v ∈ A since it only depends on the integral of the T -strategy
over the set B11 . Also, by construction, xˆ1(t) > yˆ1(t) for every t ∈ B11 . Since B11 has
a positive measure it must be that
∫
B11
xˆ1dλ >
∫
B11
yˆ1dλ. Thus, v(xˆ) > v(yˆ) and the
claim is proved.
Finally, recall that Pˆ is a compact set. By the previous claims the conditions of
the Stone-Weierstrass theorem (see e.g. Ha, 2006, Theorem 5.4.1 in page 398) hold.
Thus, we can conclude that A is dense in Y . This proves the theorem.
8.4. Proof of Proposition 1. First, it is clear that g is symmetric around 14 , so
g(α) = g(12 − α) for every α ∈ [0, 14 ]. It is therefore sufficient to compute g on the
interval [0, 14 ].
Fix 18 ≤ α ≤ 14 and consider the T -strategy where all type 1 players choose e1 and
all type 2 players e2. Obviously, the efficiency of such profile is 0. We claim that
this is a CCE. To see this, let F ′ be a set of type 1 females with measure α, and
let M ′ be a set of type 2 males with measure α. Then the T -strategy Yˆ defined by
Yˆ (t) = e1 for t ∈
(
[0, 12) \ (M ∪ F ′)
) ∪M ′ ∪ (F ∩ [12 , 1]) and Yˆ (t) = e2 otherwise is
a consistent conjecture for every player. The best response for such a belief is e1 for
type 1 players and e2 for type 2 players.
Next, consider the case where 0 ≤ α ≤ 18 . Let F ′ be a set of type 1 females with
measure 14 +α, and let M
′ be a set of type 2 males with measure 14 +α. Define xˆ by
xˆ(t) = e1 for t ∈ F ′ ∪
(
M ∩ [0, 12)
) ∪ ([12 , 1] \ (F ∪M ′)) and xˆ(t) = e2 otherwise. We
have p1(xˆ) = 14 +2α and p2(xˆ) =
1
4 − 2α so eff(xˆ) = 4(14 +2α)(14 − 2α) = 14 − 16α2.
To see that xˆ is a CCE, consider the following T -strategy yˆ. The set M ∩ [0, 12)
of type 1 males play e2 and not e1 as in xˆ. Instead, a set of measure α of type 2
males who played e2 according to xˆ is switching to e1. Similarly, the set of type 2
females is switching from e2 in xˆ to e1 in yˆ and a set of measure α of type 1 females
is switching from e1 to e2. It is clear that yˆ ∈ FCt(xˆ) for every player t. Moreover,
p1(yˆ) = 14 and p2(yˆ) =
1
4 so for every player both actions give the same payoff (thus
both are best responses to yˆ).
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Finally, notice that the efficiency of a T -strategy xˆ is decreasing in the distance
of p1(xˆ) and p2(xˆ) from 14 . It can therefore be verified that there is no categorial
equilibrium which yield a lower social efficiency.
8.5. Proof of Theorem 4. Before proving the theorem we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 12. For every finite partition R of T the map fR : Pˆ → Pˆ as defined in
subsection 6.1 is continuous in the L1 weak topology on Pˆ .
Proof. Since fR is linear, continuity in the weak topology is equivalent to continuity
in the metric topology (see Dunford and Schwartz, 1988, Theorem 15, page 422).
The latter is guaranteed by the inequality
∫
T |fR(xˆ)−fR(yˆ)|dλ ≤
∫
T |xˆ− yˆ|dλ, which
follows from the fact that fR is the projection to the subspace of T -strategies which
are measurable w.r.t. the partition R.
Fix a game u and a categorization profile C = {Ct}t∈T , with Ct coarser than some
C∗ for every t ∈ T . By Lemma 2, it is sufficient to show that there is a pure CCE
w.r.t. the categorization profile {Ct = C∗}t∈T .
Consider the map fC∗ : Pˆ → Pˆ as defined in subsection 6.1. By Lemma 12 it
is continuous. It follows that the game u¯ defined by u¯(t, xˆ) = u(t, fC∗(xˆ)) satisfies
assumptions (1) and (2) of subsection 3.2. Moreover, u¯ is an anonymous game, so
by Theorem 2 in Schmeidler (1973, see also Remark 2 there) there is a pure Nash
equilibrium in u¯.
Denote by xˆ one such pure equilibrium of u¯. We claim that xˆ is a prototypical
equilibrium (and therefore a CCE) of the game u. Indeed, for almost every t ∈
T , xˆ(t) · u¯(t, xˆ) ≥ p · u¯(t, xˆ) for all p ∈ P . For every such t, by definition of u¯,
xˆ(t) · u(t, fC∗(xˆ)) ≥ p · u(t, fC∗(xˆ)) for all p ∈ P . This is exactly the definition of a
prototypical equilibrium w.r.t. the categorization profile {Ct = C∗}t∈T .
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